In April of 2019, weeks after the second of two tragic crashes of Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation staff began receiving information from
whistleblowers detailing numerous concerns related to aviation safety.
Commerce Committee Chairman
Roger Wicker directed staff to begin an oversight investigation. The scope and breadth of the
investigation quickly expanded beyond the first allegations inspired by the 737 MAX tragedies.
Information received from fifty-seven whistleblowers revealed common themes among the allegations
including insufficient training, improper certification, FAA management acting favorably toward
operators, and management undermining of frontline inspectors. The investigation revealed that these
trends were often accompanied by retaliation against those who report safety violations and a lack of
effective oversight, resulting in a failed FAA safety management culture.
In support of the committee’s investigation, Chairman Wicker sent seven letters, which included
thirty specific requests for information to the FAA. To date more than half of the requested information
remains unanswered or incomplete. Committee staff have reviewed approximately 13,000 pages of
documents over the course of the investigation. Some of the correspondence in response to the
Chairman’s letters appeared to be contradictory and misleading. As a result of the slow response to
document requests, Chairman Wicker requested twenty-one FAA employees be made available for
interview by committee staff. Over the twenty month investigation, committee staff were permitted to
interview less than half of the employees requested. The documents received and the FAA employee
interviews conducted produced inconsistencies, contradictions, and in one case possible lack of candor.
This report details a number of significant lapses in aviation safety oversight and failed leadership
in the FAA. The committee is in receipt of many more examples and continues to receive new
information from new whistleblowers regularly. Some of the most significant findings include:
FAA senior managers have not been held accountable for failure to develop and deliver adequate
training in Flight Standards despite repeated findings of deficiencies over several decades.
The FAA continues to retaliate against whistleblowers instead of welcoming their disclosures in the
interest of safety.
The Department of Transportation Office of General Counsel (DOT OGC) failed to produce relevant
documents requested by Chairman Wicker as required by the U.S. Constitution Article 1, Section 1.
The FAA repeatedly permitted Southwest Airlines to continue operating dozens of aircraft in an
unknown airworthiness condition for several years. These flights put millions of passengers at
potential risk.
During 737 MAX recertification testing, Boeing inappropriately influenced FAA human factor
simulator testing of pilot reaction times involving a Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation
System (MCAS) failure.
FAA senior leaders may have obstructed a Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General
(DOT OIG) review of the 737 MAX crashes.
Это вступление и оно интригует. Полностью pdf на 102 страницы . Пробежал по диагонали - масса интересного. Насколько понял, основная задача была не устранить технические проблемы, но устранить реальных и потенциальных свидетелей. А также всех, способных дать показания комиссии в ходе расследования. Рекомендую к неспешному чтению в удобном кресле перед камином.
Самое же веселое это негромкое возобновление полетов 737 max с 9 декабря. Видимо, автомобильные стоянки закончились, ставить уже некуда самолеты, "надо что-то решать!" Естественно, никто ничего в техническом смысле не устранил. В документах увеличили время реакции пилота на сбои MCAS.
Суммируя: ни разу это не смешно. Если вы летаете - будьте бдительны, уточняйте тип судна. Иногда лучше медленно и печально, по земле.
